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On the Nature of the Romanian 
Political Regime
Reflections on the Recent Jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court
RADU CARP
The participation to the European Council, an issue that generated vivid debates 
during the summer of 2012 and it was one of the episodes that have amplified the conflict 
between the Prime Minister and the President which culminated with the suspension 
from office of the former and the referendum that invalidated the suspension, has led 
to the emergence of another topic that unfortunately did not benefit from the same 
intensity in the public debate: the nature of the Romanian political regime. Since the issue 
had not been permanently clarified within the public law doctrine, the Constitutional 
Court has added a new episode concerning the clarification of this regime. From the 
moment the Court was notified regarding the issue of the participation to the European 
Council, there were two options: that this conflict would not fall under the category 
of legal conflicts of constitutional nature that the Court is entitled to judge, or that this 
conflict would fall under this category and, in order to find a solution, to determine 
more precisely the nature of the political regime. The Court has chosen the second 
option. An option that proved to be an extremely difficult one, since the Decision 
no. 683/20121 was adopted with a majority of 5 to 4, and all the 4 judges that voted 
against felt the need to express separate opinions.
In order to resolve the notification of the Presidential Administration, the Court 
wished to decide first upon the fact whether the given situation corresponds to a 
legal conflict of constitutional nature. A positive answer in this regard was given 
by the Court invoking the letter exchange between the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and a deputy minister from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and a 
presidential counselor, on the other hand. Thus, the conflict situation is, according to 
the Court, ”born and present” due to certain concrete acts already committed, which 
means that this conflict cannot emerge only with the effective participation of the 
President to the European Council. From this article’s perspective, it does not matter 
that much why this conflict has been labeled as having a legal nature, but mostly why 
it has been decided that it has a constitutional nature. In order to reach this conclusion, 
the Court stressed the fact that this conflict concerns the interpretation of article 80, 
paragraph 1 and article 102, paragraph 1 from the Constitution and, according to a 
previous decision of the Court, if the public authorities interpret and apply differently 
a constitutional disposition, the existence of a legal conflict of constitutional nature 
is proven2. Thus, the answer to the first question (the existence of a conflict that the 
Court is entitled to judge) is strongly linked to the answer to the question that has to 
right to represent Romanian to the European Council.
1 Official Journal, no. 701/12.10.2012.
2 Decision no. 270/2008, Official Journal, no. 290/15.04.2008.
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In order to provide an answer to the second question, the Court has analyzed 
first the nature of the European Council and of the representativeness of the EU 
Member States. The Court notices that it is not possible to partition the agenda of the 
European Council on certain issues that could possibly justify the participation of the 
President in certain situations and of the Prime Minister in other situations, because 
the mandate of representation of the state is ”a permanent one and not one divided 
between two public authorities”. Furthermore, the appointment of the right person 
to represent a Member State is aimed at ”ensuring the representation of the Member 
State at the highest level by the competent public authority”.
Why is it important to clarify the nature of a political regime in order to decide 
who participates to the European Council? The Court states that the participation 
at presidential level occurs due to the existing political regime (the case of France – 
semi-presidential regime and of Cyprus – presidential regime) or due to an agreement 
between the political actors (case of Lithuania – semi-presidential regime). As a 
consequence, if in Romania the Constitution does not divide the competences within 
the executive in order to affirm without any reservation the right of the President to 
participate to the European Council, if there is no agreement between the political 
actors as in Lithuania, it remains only the solution of interpreting the norms from the 
Constitution by the Court in order to determine the nature of the political regime.
In order to carry out this analysis, the Court based itself on certain interpretations 
from the doctrine. The first such interpretation used is that of Maurice Duverger, the 
first author who theorized semi-presidential regime1. The Court quotes two of his 
contributions in order to affirm that the semi-presidential regime shall fulfill three 
conditions:
– The President to be elected by universal suffrage;
– The President to be empowered with considerable competences;
– The President to be assisted by a Prime Minister and ministers, part of the 
executive power, who can stay in power unless the Parliament opposes. 
According to the Court, the first and the third conditions are fulfilled in the case of 
Romania, remaining to discuss the second condition based on the analysis that Robert 
Elgie dedicates to Duverger’s model2. The nature of ”the considerable competences” 
is argued by the Court as follows:
”Along with other elements, in addition to the Romanian President’s role in 
the foreign policy, as well as his capacity as head of the armed forces, president 
of the Supreme Council of National Defense, his competence to request the 
reexamining of a law, to notify the Constitutional Court, to designate the 
candidate for the Prime Minister seat, to appoint an interim Prime Minister, to 
appoint ministers, to request the prosecution of the members of the Cabinet, to 
consult the country’s population through referendum, to make appointments to 
public offices, to grant individual pardons, the political regime must be labeled as a 
semi-presidential one” (our emphasis).
1 Maurice DUVERGER, Échec au roi, Albin Michel, Paris, 1978; IDEM, ”A New Political 
System Model: Semi-presidential Government”, European Journal of Political Research, no. 8, 
1980, pp. 165-187.
2 Robert ELGIE, ”Duverger,Semi-presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype”, 
West European Politics, vol. 2, no. 32, 2009, p. 248 et seq.
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The Court did not limit itself to give this verdict based exclusively on the 
interpretation of the constitutional norms, but withheld to invoke its own jurisprudence1 
to prove the existence of the President’s ”considerable competences”.
Regarding the participation to the European Council, the Court stated that, in 
accordance with art. 80, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, the President represent the 
Romanian state, which ”allows him to draw the future guidelines that the state will 
follow in its foreign policy”. Such a statement is, according to the Court, ”legitimated 
by the representative character of his office, the Romanian President being elected by 
the citizens through universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed vote”. The 
Prime Minister has the competence to ensure the achievement of the foreign policy, 
in accordance with art. 102, paragraph 1 from the Constitution, which means that the 
Government ”is due to duly implement the measures the state has committed to”. 
The representation of the state can be thus delegated by the President to the Prime 
Minister.
The Court has also analyzed the Parliament’s Declaration no. 1/2012, which 
established a division of competences between the President and the Government in 
the field of foreign affairs. The Declaration credited the idea of a horizontal division 
of competences but this division is in practice vertical, between the definition of the 
foreign policy guidelines (President) and their implementation (Government). This 
Declaration was invoked by the Government in front of the Court in order to justify 
the participation of the Prime Minister to the European Council.
In a separate opinion, three judges of the Court consider that there was no legal 
conflict of constitutional nature to justify the Court’s competence, but rather the 
problem of deciding who represents Romania, a problem of political nature ”that 
needs to be settled by the Parliament when there are disagreements regarding this 
between the President and the Prime Minister”, hence justifying the relevance of the 
Parliament’s Declaration mentioned above.
In another separate opinion, it was considered that this Declaration cannot be 
subject to the Court’s control, being a political act, and this act does not create a legal 
conflict of constitutional nature between the President and the Prime Minister. For 
this opinion to be fully argued, its author should have stated that the Court’s labeling 
of the correspondence between the MFA’s representatives and of the Presidential 
Administration as conflict generating, is not actually underlying any legal conflict of 
constitutional nature.
There was also a concurring opinion which was aimed at strengthening the 
existence of a legal conflict of constitutional nature. Thus, it was stated that the 
Parliament cannot notice and solve conflicts of constitutional nature, a competence 
belonging exclusively to the Constitutional Court. It was also considered that the EU 
is made of sovereign states, which actually impede the labeling of the issues on the 
agenda of the European Council as issues of internal politics. The best proof of the 
existence of such a conflict is that the Parliament has adopted a law regarding the 
cooperation between the Parliament and the Government in the field of European 
affairs which was challenged at the Court, a case unresolved by the Court at the time 
1 Decision no. 98/2008, Official Journal, no. 140/22.02.2008; Decision no. 799/2011, Official 
Journal, no 440/23.06.2011; Decision no. 270/2008, Official Journal, no. 290/15.04.2008; Decision 
no. 384/2006, Official Journal, no. 451/24.05.2006; Decision no. 375/2005, Official Journal, 
no. 491/8.07.2005.
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of the examination of the legal conflict of constitutional nature between the President 
and the Prime Minister (June 27, 2012), a conclusion valid also at the time of the 
publishing of this decision (July 12, 2012).
This last case was resolved through Decision no. 784/20121. This decision is of 
interest to this article only because it invokes the Decision no. 683/2012, stating that 
”in arguing this solution, the Court has withheld in essence, that the political regime 
established by the Constitution must be qualified as being a semi-presidential one”. 
Through Decision no. 784/2012 the Court observed that a number of three articles 
from the law mentioned above are unconstitutional, among others the one stating 
that the representative of Romania to the European Council is established through an 
agreement between the Government and the Presidential Administration, which is 
contrary to the article no. 80, paragraph 2 from the Constitution, the reason being that 
only the President, according to the Decision no. 683/2012, can represent the State 
at the proceedings of the European Council. Note that this decision, as the previous 
one, was taken with a majority of 5 to 4, the 4 judges that voted against formulating a 
separate opinion. For our analysis, it is relevant the position expressed in this separate 
opinion according to which ”qualifying the Romanian political regime as being a 
semi-presidential one does not involve also the president’s exclusive right to engage 
the state within the European Council’s reunions”. Therefore, there is a consensus 
at the level of the Constitutional Court according to which the Romanian political 
regime is semi-presidential, the disagreements between the judges being generated 
by the contrary positions linked to the consequence of such a qualification in what 
concerns the representation of Romania to the European Council.
It is really necessary such an analysis of the Court in order to decide an issue 
that is undoubtedly important but, eventually, does not represent the essential 
aspect of the functioning of the institutions described by the Constitution. Given the 
weight of the moment, the irreconcilable tensions between the Prime Minister and 
the President, the Court had to settle this issue and to give it all the attention, in 
order not to see its legitimacy called into question. For trying to obtain a consensual 
solution, it was first tried to see which the lowest common denominator of the Court’s 
judge’s opinions is, and this was the nature of the political regime. The Court had 
on countless occasions the opportunity to affirm on this issue; each time it discussed 
the nature of the prerogatives of the two heads of the executive. But it never did it 
before the decision from 2012. The explanation lies in the quoted paragraph from the 
Decision no. 784/2012: all the Court’s judges agreed that we are dealing with a semi-
presidential regime. Otherwise, in which concern the consequences of this statement, 
all the aspects in litigation, the Court’s judges were not able to agree. 
We might be tempted to think that the Decision no. 683/2012 takes into account 
and thus clarifies all the doctrinal disputes, and that the qualification of the regime as 
semi-presidential will remain valid until a possible constitutional revision will modify 
substantially the way of defining it and the competences of the President and the Prime 
Minister. Actually, the Court’s judges have put forward their own interpretation of 
the Constitution which is not entirely based on any of the interpretations formulated 
so far in the doctrine. None of the Romanian or foreign authors who took a stance 
on the current Constitution have clearly stated that it is a genuine semi-presidential 
regime, in Duverger’s form. As a matter of fact, the Court does not invoke any author 
1 Official Journal, no. 701/12.10.2012.
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apart from Maurice Duverger and Robert Elgie, both being quoted with contributions 
that are not related to Romania.
The first attempt to define the Romanian political regime belongs to certain 
authors who have actually been involved in the drafting of the Constitution1. 
These do not question the existence of a semi-presidential regime, different from 
the parliamentarian and the presidential ones. This regime is characterized by the 
election of the head of state through universal, direct or indirect (Finland’s case) 
vote, the government is accountable to the Parliament, and the president’s role is 
”important” (probably a reference to the ”considerable competences” theorized 
by Duverger). Among all the features of the semi-presidential regime, only a few 
are found, according to the authors, in the Romanian Constitution. Most are found 
”under various forms meant to diminish the ‘weight’ of the political influence of 
the country’s president”. Our political regime is characterized as one where there is 
a limitation of ”the presidential functions” and an adaptation of ”certain solutions 
specific for parliamentarian regimes”. It is not actually specified which are these 
limitations and adaptations that differentiates the Romanian political regime from 
the presidential regime or the parliamentarian one and which is the correspondent in 
the constitutional texts. These authors’ conclusion is that 
”our political regime can be characterized as an ‘softened’ or ‘parliamentarised’ 
semi-presidential regime, in the sense of increasing the contribution to the state’s 
political life of the others factors of power and, especially, of the Parliament”.
In other words, it is considered that the Parliament’s competences would 
a counterweight to those of the President and thus the political regime cannot be 
ascribed neither in the category of the parliamentary ones, nor in that of the semi-
presidential ones, actually borrowing from both. This conclusion is not based on a 
comparative research of the competences of the President, Prime Minister, Government 
or Parliament in the semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes, in order to clearly 
see where the Romanian political regime is situated. It is true, on the other hand, that 
in 1992 such an analysis could not be carried out given the short period of time from 
the adoption of the Constitution that did not allow the creation of certain institutional 
practices and the Constitutional Court did not have yet the occasion to rule on certain 
provisions essential for the relations between the powers and within the state’s 
powers.
The same opinion is supported also by Antonie Iorgovan in 2005. This is in fact 
completely in line with the opinion expressed in the paper above mentioned but, on 
the other hand, claims that once with the Constitution revision in 2003, the Romanian 
political regime became semi-parliamentary, fully agreeing with the opinion 
expressed by the authors of a commentary to the revised Constitution. For Antonie 
Iorgovan, the semi-presidential regime is identical to the semi-parliamentary one, as 
also resulted from the subtitle he uses: ”Arguments of constitutional nature for semi-
presidential or semi-parliamentary regime”. If we read carefully the commentary to 
the Constitution, referred to by Antonie Iorgovan, we notice that its authors do not 
1 Mihai CONSTANTINESCU, Ion DELEANU, Antonie IORGOVAN, Ioan MURARU, 
Florin VASILESCU, Ioan VIDA, Constituţia României – comentată şi adnotată, Regia Autonomă 
”Monitorul Oficial”, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 184. The author of this comment is Florin Vasilescu.
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consider the revision from 2003 as essential for the political regime change, but they 
rather propose that instead of the phrase ”softened semi-presidential regime” the 
phrase ”semi-parliamentary regime to be used”1.
Antonie Iorgovan offers 12 arguments in favor of the existence of a semi-pre-
sidential regime:
”– The Parliament and the President are elected through universal suffrage, being 
representative bodies at national level;
– The right of the President to dissolve the Parliament can be exercised only by 
respecting certain conditions;
– The Parliament can bring the President to account, by suspending him from 
office and subsequentlyby organizing a referendum;
– The Parliament can decide the impeachment of the President for high treason;
– The President can ask the people to express their will through referendum;
– The President appoints a candidate for the Prime Minister office and appoints 
the government based on a confidence vote granted by the Parliament;
– The government is accountable to the Parliament;
– The President and each Chamber can request the prosecution of the members 
of the Cabinet;
– The President does not have the right to legislative initiative;
– The President’s refusal to pass a law can be exercised only once;
– The most important competences of the President in the field of foreign policy, 
of defense, of extraordinary states are conditioned, in their application, either by the 
will of the Government, either by that of the Parliament or they are  under the control 
of the Parliament;
– The presidential decrees, issued in the application of the most important 
competences, are countersigned by the Prime Minister”2.
In another commentary to the Constitution, that of Ştefan Deaconu, part of a 
book edited by two of the authors of the commentary to the Constitution quoted by 
Antonie Iorgovan, it is considered that 
”a careful analysis of all the competences given by the Constitution to the 
President makes us notice that, in fact, from the point of view of the form of 
government, Romania is a semi-presidential republic, but with a lot reduced 
competences for the head of state”3.
This perspective is manly based on the much reduced possibilities of the 
President to dissolve the Parliament. Ştefan Deaconu’s opinion is different from those 
previously presented. In the same context Ştefan Deaconu makes a presentation of the 
political regimes of the 27 EU’s Member States, and in the category ”semi-presidential 
1 Mihai CONSTANTINESCU, Antonie IORGOVAN, Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina 
TĂNĂSESCU, Constituţia României revizuită – comentarii şi explicaţii, All Beck, Bucureşti, 2004, 
pp. 157-158.
2 Antonie IORGOVAN, Tratat de drept administrativ, vol. I, All Beck, Bucureşti, 2005, 
pp. 294-298.
3 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina TĂNĂSESCU (eds), Constituţia României. Comentariu pe 
articole, C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 756.
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republic” he includes Austria, Bulgaria, France, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia1.
Tudor Drăganu didn’t limit himself at considering that the Romanian political 
regime is part of a category or another, but he analyzed the issue of semi-presidential 
regimes in all its complexity. While presenting the political regimes, Tudor Drăganu 
takes into consideration also the semi-presidential regime, saying that 
”the evolution of the constitutional life in certain countries led to the emergence 
of such hybrids systems, which, breaking the traditional models of both 
parliamentary and presidential regimes, tried to reach compromising solutions, 
situated somewhere in the middle of the road which separates them, some 
authors from the west literature do not hesitate to talk about ‘semi-presidential 
regimes’”2.
According to Tudor Drăganu, in this category Maurice Duverger could belong 
but, on the other hand, it is underlined the fact that in other authors’ opinion (Marcel 
Prelot) we cannot talk about a new regime by reference to France’s Constitution from 
1958, but about an “eclectic regime”3. Also, the opinion according to which the French 
political regime wouldn’t be semi-presidential, but of another nature is not singular, 
it has been claimed also by other authors more recently4.
Tudor Drăganu builds a complex analysis of the type of political regime 
established by the Romanian Constitution. First, there are highlighted the differences 
towards the French model regarding the President’s prerogatives:
– The French President can rule through referendum above the Parliament’s will, 
in Romania is needed the consultation of the Parliament;
– The French President has large competences in crisis situations, much more 
developed than his homologue;
– The French President appoints the Prime Minister, the Romanian one appoints 
only after the confidence vote from the Parliament;
– The French President signs the government’s ordinances, in Romania they are 
signed by the Prime Minister and the minister in charge;
– The French President can dissolve the Parliament after the consultation of 
the Parliament and of the Prime Minister, the Romanian President can dissolve the 
Parliament in only one case5.
According to Tudor Drăganu, the 1991 Constitution’s authors had the constant 
preoccupation of diminishing the role of the President, so as the Prime Minister to 
have the main role within the Executive, quoting Antonie Iorgovan who claimed 
that ”the most important political function of the country is the function of Prime 
Minister”6. But on the other hand, this conception was not followed unitarily within 
1 Ibidem, p. 765.
2 Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, vol. I, Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 
1998, p. 287.
3 Marcel PRÉLOT, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Dalloz, Paris, 1972, 
pp. 580-583.
4 Jean-Louis Quermonne considers that the French political regime is ”dual presidential” 
(Les régimes politiques occidentaux, Seuil, Paris, 2006, p. 165).
5 Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional…cit., vol. II, p. 226.
6 Antonie IORGOVAN, Drept administrativ, vol. III, Proarcadia, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 56.
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the Constitution, since the President was offered the function of mediator between 
the state’s powers. Because of this prerogative, the President has more powers than 
the head of state from a parliamentary regime and less than the French President 
who also has the competence of mediation between the state’s powers. In other 
words, the fact that this prerogative was taken from the French model is the best 
argument in favor of a semi-presidential regime, even if it is less developed than its 
inspirational model. Another difference from the parliamentary regimes is related to 
the President’s competences that can be exercised by the President without the need 
of consulting the Prime Minister or another minister. Even in the cases where the 
counter-signature of the Prime Minister is needed, this condition is not drawn as in 
the case of parliamentary regimes.
Tudor Drăganu introduces in this analysis also the practices of the political 
regime that can influence its nature. In the case of a cohabitation of the President and 
the Parliament, the President’s role as mediator is reduced at the mediation between 
the President and the Parliament. But, even in this case, the President ”being up in 
the air, will have to resign with a passive role and to comply with the political line 
established by the Prime Minister in accordance with the Parliament”1. In the case of 
such cohabitation, the political regime is not anymore semi-presidential, but it tends 
to the characteristics of the parliamentary regime. This tendency can be observed 
not only in the case of cohabitation, but also in the case when the President decides 
to have an approach typical for a head of state appointed by the Parliament. The 
example given by Tudor Drăganu is the case when the President appeals to the Prime 
Minister to countersign all his documents2. All these commentaries do not determine 
Tudor Drăganu to affirm that the Romanian political regime would be included in the 
category of parliamentary regimes, but he claims very clear that this regime is semi-
presidential3.
Dana Tofan also makes a thorough analysis of the type of political regime. 
Starting from three different views, that of the softened semi-presidential regime 
(Florin Vasilescu), that of the parliamentary-regime (Ioan Vida4) and that of the semi-
pre si dential regime (Tudor Drăganu), the author considers that 
”a strong personality could contribute effectively, in time, to increase the 
institution’s position, mostly because of the way of regulation of the presidential 
competences which, even if often conditioned, leave at the President’s disposal, 
in an enough number of situations, a large margin of appreciation, in the decision 
that will be taken”. 
Dana Tofan thus considers that, because of the political practices, the Romanian 
regime can wear not only the cloths of the semi-presidential regime but also those of 
the parliamentary one but also [or] those of the presidential one. The same as for Tudor 
Drăganu, essential in defining the nature of the political regime, is for Dana Tofan the 
President’s function of mediation. The author issues an opinion extremely interesting 
1 Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional…cit., vol. II, p. 233.
2 Ibidem, p. 235.
3 Ibidem, p. 229.
4 Ioan VIDA, Puterea executivă şi administraţia publică, Regia Autonomă ”Monitorul Oficial”, 
Bucureşti, 1994, p. 38.
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which is worth being reported: that article would be a ”pact” between two political 
views from the Constituent Assembly, the republican one and the monarchical one, 
the last one being justified because of the fact that the President, like the constitutional 
monarch, cannot have a political affiliation1
Constanţa Călinoiu and Victor Duculescu say unequivocally the fact that Romania 
is a ”semi-presidential republic”, because of the way of regulation of the President’s 
prerogatives2.
Dan Claudiu Dănişor is making only a classification of the political regimes, 
without expressing if Romania is or not part of this category. In this view, there are only 
two features of the semi-presidential regime: a president elected through universal 
vote, a Prime Minister and a government accountable to Parliament. The first feature 
is to be found also within the presidential regimes, but not also the second one. Dan 
Claudiu Dănişor insists on the oscillations of the semi-presidential regime caused 
by the political practices but he didn’t mention that in this way the regime becomes 
presidential or parliamentary. There are four this kind of situations that makes the 
difference in which concern the concrete exercise of the relations between the powers:
– The majority (parliamentarian) is on the same side with the President and 
recognize it as chief;
– The President is member of the majority but he’s not his head;
– The majority is opposed to the President;
– There is no majority.
Dan Claudiu Dănişor does not limit only at presenting Duverger’s theory, but 
mentions also the criticism to the notion of semi-presidential regime theorized by 
Georges Burdeau or Bernard Chantebout3.
Genoveva Vrabie’s analysis starts from the Constitution’s article that describes 
the President’s mediation. According to her, there is a contradiction between this 
provision and the rest of the articles from the Constitution that are describing the 
President’s role. Genoveva Vrabie fully agrees Tudor Drăganu’s approach on this 
topic, including the differences between the Romanian and French political regimes. 
The French model is imported but not entirely, which means that ”a too large hat is 
put on the Romanian President’s head”. Genoveva Vrabie claims that ”the Romanian 
political regime is, as the French one, a mixed regime, but differently articulated”. 
It is not used the phrase ”semi-presidential regime”, but that of ”mixed regime”, 
which denotes, in our opinion, the author’s intention of keeping a distance from the 
terminology introduced by Duverger and of having a wider opening towards the 
alternative expressions that describe this type of regime4.
Simina Tănăsescu considers that the Romanian political regime is semi-
presidential but, from the way that the President’s prerogatives had been exercised 
over the time, we are on a slippery slope, so that ”it is possible that this system will 
be considered, in the future, purely presidential”. The author believes that there is a 
1 Dana APOSTOL TOFAN, Puterea discreţionară şi excesul de putere al autorităţilor publice, All 
Beck, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 277-278.
2 Constanţa CĂLINOIU, Victor DUCULESCU, Drept constitutional şi instituţii politice, 
Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 188.
3 Dan Claudiu DĂNIŞOR, Drept constitutional şi instituţii politice, vol. I, C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 
2007, pp. 489-491.
4 Genoveva VRABIE, Le régime politique et constitutionnel de la Roumanie post-décembriste, 
Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010, pp. 332-333.
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great discrepancy between the President’s prerogatives, as they are defined by the 
Constitution, and his real power, this fact being possible because of the Constitution’s 
ambiguities:
”The difference between the constitutional and the real powers of the head 
of state can offer an idea of how impossible is to certainly qualify the Romanian 
political system. Over the time, the Romanian Presidents interfered with the 
Parliament’s constitutional powers, through ways being often at the limit of 
unconstitutionality or they interfered with the decision power of the Government 
or of the Prime Minister in domains where the fundamental law does not operate 
with a clear separation of competences”1.
Camelia Tomescu confines to assert that ”the system of representation of the state’s 
powers presents itself into a semi-presidential version” and to mention the opinions 
from the doctrine according to which the Romanian political regime is ”softened 
semi-presidential”2. The author presents the features of the semi-presidential regime 
about which she considers that it had borrowed from the parliamentary regime ”the 
existence of a collegial and solidarygovernment, accountable to the Chamber elected 
through universal direct vote”, and from the presidential regime ”the institution of 
the elected President …through universal direct suffrage and who has not only the 
authority conferred by this kind of election, but often also very important powers”. 
These borrowed aspects lead to the existence, within the semi-presidential regime, 
of ”certain incoherencies from the functional point of view”3. According to Camelia 
Tomescu, the European countries’ tendency is to go not toward the version of the 
semi-presidential regime, but toward regimes where the government’s role is 
considerable, and a perfect semi-presidential model, which fosters stability in all 
conditions, does not exist. The same author presents in detail in another contribution 
the semi-presidential regime and the criticism of this concept, among which that one 
referring to the fact that the President is not elected through universal suffrage in all 
the states (Finland, Ireland) which are part of this category. Camelia Tomescu presents 
the President’s role within the semi-presidential regime, emphasizing the relations 
with the Prime Minister, especially his designation. In the category of the countries 
that are presented there are also the countries which were not analyzed by Duverger 
(Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland)4.
The semi-presidential regime is treated in the Romanian doctrine not only in 
terms of public law but also from the perspective of the political science. Taking a 
classical distinction, Alexandru Radu considers that there are four types of democratic 
political regimes: presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary and directorial. The 
semi-presidential regime is considered as a ”mixed formula of government”, and the 
mixed nature is regarded as its weak point. The problem of such a regime is, according 
to Alexandru Radu, that the parliamentary majorities do not always generate 
1 Simina TĂNĂSESCU, ”The President of Romania, or the Slippery Slope of a Political 
System”, European Constitutional Law Review, no. 4, 2008, pp. 64-97.
2 Camelia TOMESCU, ”Raporturile dintre şeful statului şi primul-ministru în ţările Uniunii 
Europene”, Revista de drept public, nr. 3, 2009, pp. 59-60.
3 Ibidem, p. 55.
4 Camelia-Rodica TOMESCU, Raporturile dintre Guvern şi Parlament, C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 
2012, pp. 216-228.
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political stability1. The merit of Alexandru Radu’s analysis is that of introducing in 
the Romanian literature dedicated to the semi-presidential regime two authors of 
political science: Arend Lijphart and Giovanni Sartori. According to Lijphart, there 
are only presidential and parliamentary regimes, and the category semi-presidential 
is challenged on the grounds that the countries that would enter into this could be 
assimilated two the first two categories, once with the answer to the question who is 
the real head of the government2. Giovanni Sartori admits the existence of a separate 
category of semi-presidential regime and considers that this category is characterized 
by the following features:
– The President is elected through popular vote – directly or indirectly – for a 
preset time;
– The President shares the executive power with a Prime Minister and enters 
therefore into a dual authority structure;
– The President is independent from the Parliament but he cannot govern alone;
– The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are independent from the President, to the 
extent they are subjected to both parliamentary trust and distrust, and to the extent 
that they need the support of a parliamentary majority;
– The dualistic authority structure admits different balances and arrangements 
of power within the executive, so that ”the autonomy potential” of each component 
of the executive subsists.
For Sartori, the semi-presidentialism is better than the presidentialism and more 
applicable than the parliamentary but it is not ”the best”. Sartori says that the semi-
presidentalism has many virtues and it presents a different type of political regime, 
”the alternating presidentialism”, without explaining which of the two regimes would 
be preferable3.
Alexandru Radu has the merit of presenting, for the first time in the Romanian 
thematic literature, a comparison between Duverger’s model of semi-presidential 
regime and that one of Sartori: if for Duverger the semi-presidential regime ”represents 
an alternation between presidential and parliamentary phases”, for Sartori the head 
of the executive varies depending on how the parliamentarian majorities change. 
For Alexandru Radu, this ”oscillation of heads” is ”the solution for blocking the 
potential conflict typical for every two-headed power structure”4. Also, Alexandru 
Radu presents the theory that denies the existence of the semi-presidential regime, 
belonging to Matthew Shughart and John Carey; they consider that instead there 
are regimes that ensure the supremacy of the Prime Minister – the semi-presidential 
regime or of the president – parliamentary-presidential regime5.
Two other authors dealing with the Romanian political regime from the perspec-
tive of the political science and starting from the premise of its semi-presidential nature 
1 Alexandru RADU, Sisteme politice contemporane. Forme de guvernare în 29 de state, 
C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2010, pp. 24-25.
2 Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999, p. 121.
3 Giovanni SARTORI, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, 
Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, New York University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 131-132.
4 Alexandru RADU, Sisteme politice contemporane…cit., p. 30.
5 Matthew S. SHUGHART, John M. CAREY, Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design 
and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
422
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 3 • 2013
RADU CARP
are Bogdan Dima1 and Raluca Mariana Negulescu2 who are providing summaries of 
the approaches from the thematic literature, both foreign and Romanian authors.
One of the most important foreign authors who have elaborated on the topic of 
the nature of the Romanian political regime and who produced, together with Tudor 
Drăganu, one of the most complex analysis on this topic is Giovanni Sartori. He 
published two articles on this theme, the first of them being translated into Romanian 
and can be found in the annex of the book Comparative Constitutional Engineering3.
Sartori is the only author (excepting Ioan Vida, in the Romanian doctrine) who 
argues that the Romanian political regime is parliamentary and not semi-presidential. 
His arguments are based on the Constitution’s provisions:
– The President’s function of mediator is a typical one for the parliamentary-
regime, in the variations of presidential and semi-presidential regimes the President 
is part of the political actors’ game;
– The President has no independent power to appoint the Prime Minister, but 
only through consultation with the parliamentary political parties. In the case of a 
reshuffle, the ministers that are to be included into the Cabinet are proposed by the 
Prime Minister (at the time Sartori was editing this article, the Constitutional Court 
hadn’t decided yet that the President has the right to refuse, only once, such a proposal 
and to as the Prime Minister to make motivated another proposal4);
– The President can consult the Government with regards to the urgent matters 
and of utmost importance and can participate at certain Cabinet reunions. These are 
the specific prerogatives of a head of state in semi-presidential regimes, but the phrase 
”can” has the meaning of a weak feature of the political regime;
– The dissolution of the Parliament by the President can be done only consulting 
it, which points out to a feature of parliamentary regimes;
– The referendum can be called for by the President with the consultation of the 
Parliament. Calling for a referendum is typical to presidential regimes, but Sartori 
argues that this institution can be qualified as pertaining to a political regime or 
another only by examining the way it is applied5. 
Sartori also offers an explanation for choosing this institutional design. Romania 
has experienced throughout communism the most radical form of presidentialism 
and desired to create a two-headed executive, in which a mutual control between the 
two heads of the executive exists.
Ioan Stanomir is one of the few Romanian authors6 that mentions Giovanni 
Sartori’s contribution to the analysis of the nature of the Romanian political system, 
placing in parallel Sartori’s analysis with that of Tudor Drăganu, but initially avoids 
to state whether he considers the Romanian political system as semi-presidential or 
1 Bogdan DIMA, ”Semiprezidenţialismul românesc postdecembrist”, Sfera Politicii, 
no. 139, 2009, pp. 14-28.
2 Raluca Mariana NEGULESCU, ”Reflecţii – semiprezidenţialismul în România”, Sfera 
Politicii, nr. 139, 2009, pp. 29-36.
3 Giovanni SARTORI, ”Sul sistema costituzionale romeno”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political 
Science Review, vol. II, no. 1, 2002, pp. 9-12; IDEM, ”Alcuni chiarimenti sul semiprezidenzialismo”, 
Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 3, 2003, pp. 617-620.
4 Decision no. 98/2008, Official Journal, no. 140/22.02.2008.
5 Giovanni SARTORI, ”Sul sistema costituzionale romeno”, cit.
6 See also Raluca Mariana NEGULESCU, ”Reflecţii…cit.”.
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parliamentary1. In a book published one year later, Ioan Stanomir distances himself 
from Giovanni Sartori’s model and clearly states that the Romanian political regime 
is semi-presidential:
”The reading applied by Giovanni Sartori to the Romanian Constitution is 
edifying, even though the hypothesis of the impossibility to describe Romania 
as typical semi-presidential system is amendable: even if it departs from the 
French precedent, Romania does not remains less important as a softened semi 
presidential version. The application of Sartori’s original criteria is perfectly 
possible in the Romanian case”2.
Another author that has addressed the nature of the Romanian political system 
is Olivier Duhamel. When discussing about the ”new semi-presidential regimes from 
Eastern Europe”, Duhamel considers that we are dealing with heads of state incapable 
of creating political parties to support them, with the exception of Romania, where 
President Ion Iliescu, supported by a parliamentary majority, revoked the Prime 
Minister Petre Roman. However, Duhamel considers that the semi-presidential regime 
practiced in Romania is ”slightly special”, because the first ballot of the presidential 
elections coincides with the parliamentary elections3. Since the date of the drafting 
of these considerations (1993), both provisions have been modified, currently the 
revoking of the Prime Minister by the President being forbidden by the Constitution 
and the presidential and parliamentary elections being delayed due to the different 
lengths of the terms in office (5, respectively 4).
Oliver Duhamel is the author of a typology of ”systems”, opposed to that of 
the ”regimes”, based on the means of exercising the power on accordance with 
international practices. Thus, Duhamel considers that there are three types of such 
systems: parliamentarian (the government is the result of a party coalition that has 
not been designated by the voters, but was rather constituted after the elections), 
governmental (a parliamentary majority is headed by a leader that is also the incumbent 
Prime Minister) and presidential (the Government is under the authority of a head of 
state elected directly or indirectly)4. The attempt to adapt Duhamel’s typology to the 
Romanian political regime indicates that it should theoretically be presidential, but 
practically it alternates between the governmental and the parliamentarian systems5, 
which proves once more the hybrid and unique character of this regime.
The Romanian political regime has been subject to two analyses that dealt 
with a possible constitutional revision: the first one had an institutional character, 
being the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Analysis of the Political and 
Constitutional Regime in Romania (CPARPCR) from 2009, and the second one, the 
Report of the Commission for a New Constitution (CON) from 2012, is the result of a 
1 Ioan STANOMIR, Constituţionalism şi postcomunism. Un comentariu al Constituţiei României, 
2nd edition, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, Bucurreşti, 2007, p. 123 et seq.
2 IDEM, ”Regândind Constituţia: teme şi interogaţii”, in Radu CARP, Ioan STANOMIR, 
Limitele Constituţiei. Despre guvernare, politică şi cetăţenie în România, C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2008, 
p. 265.
3 Olivier DUHAMEL, Les démocraties, Seuil, Paris, 1993, p. 179.
4 Ibidem, pp. 275-276.
5 Radu CARP, ”România: sistem politic şi regim constituţional”, Sfera Politicii, no. 44, 1996, 
pp. 14-16.
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series of public debates initiated by the Horia Rusu Foundation, as a reaction to the 
first report. None of these initiatives was fully assumed by any political party, even 
though the foundation is close to the nature of a think-tank of a political party.
CPARPCR Report provides an overview of the existing political regimes, among 
which also the semi-presidential one. It is stated that there are three types of such 
regimes: presidential regimes, regimes with heads of state that have a ceremonial role 
and the French system of equitably dividing the prerogatives between the chiefs of 
the executive. The conclusion of the authors of this report is that Romania can choose 
between two evolution paths of the semi-presidential regime, excluding the presidential 
alternative. The Report claims that there are both advantages and disadvantages of the 
parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes. The main advantages of choosing a French-
type semi-presidential regime would be, according to the authors of this Report:
– The resolution of constitutional crises becomes possible by simplifying the right 
of dissolving the Parliament;
– Establishment of a new type of balance between the President and the Prime 
Minister;
– The President, by means of dissolving of the Parliament, can benefit from a 
stable political majority that can help him implement the program underlying his 
election1.
CON Report is built on the same logic, of presenting the advantages and 
disadvantages of the three types of political regimes. The terminology differs, the 
one specific to political science being opted for (parliamentary, presidential, semi-
presidential). After an overview of the definitions of semi-presidentialism, Antonie 
Iorgovan is also quoted with his attempt to define the features of the Romanian 
version of political regime. The phrase ”softened semi-presidential” does not belong 
to Antonie Iorgovan, but to Florin Vasilescu. According to the opinion of the authors 
of the CON Report, the Constitution was grounded on a vision concerning the way the 
President can exercise his competences, a vision that has been denied into practice, the 
Presidents exercising a ”political and personal influence far larger than the constituent 
legislator had initially desired to offer”2. Unlike the CPARPCR Report that made more 
recommendations regarding the change of the current political regime with a different 
one, CON Report makes such a recommendation: ”A solution is the modification of 
the fundamental law and the switch to a rationalized parliamentary system”3. What 
happens with such a recommendation if Giovanni Sartori proved right and we are 
facing a parliamentary regime instead of a semi-presidential one?
More than 22 years after the adoption of the Constitution from 1991, the doctrine 
of public law and the authors of political science – the paper does not claim to exhaust 
all these contributions – have not yet managed to agree on the nature of the political 
regime established by this Constitution. The features of semi-presidential regime 
practiced in other countries have been only taken over partially or altered in the 
Romanian Constitution, which led to the stated opinion that we are currently dealing 
with a softened or parliamentarised semi-presidential regime. Giovanni Sartori’s 
1 Raportul Comisiei Prezidenţiale de Analiză a Regimului Politic şi Constituţional din România. 
Pentru consolidarea statului de drept, C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 37.
2 Bogdan DIMA, Elena Simina TĂNĂSESCU (eds.), Raportul Comisiei pentru o nouă 
Constituţie. Reforma constituţională: analiză şi proiecţii, Universul Juridic, Bucureşti, 2012, p. 48.
3 Ibidem, p. 184.
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opinion that pleads for the existence of a parliamentary system is rather singular, 
but rooted in a thorough analysis of the Romanian Constitution in comparison to 
other constitutions and political regimes. The Constitutional Court has qualified this 
political regime as being semi-presidential through Decision no. 683/2012, being 
the only consensual element between the 9 judges summoned to resolve a conflict 
situation between the two heads of the executive. What has generated consensus 
at the Court’s level is not consensual among all authors addressing this problem. 
Proceeding as such, the Court has resolved the case it was called upon to solve, but 
this does not mean that the problem concerning the nature of the Romanian political 
regime is no longer open, as long as we will be subject to the current Constitution.
